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BOOK REVIEWS

The Trinity: A Philosophical Investigation, by H.E. Baber. SCM Press, 2019.
Pp. v + 204. $92.00 (hardcover).
ALAN J. PIHRINGER, Harvest Baptist
H.E. Baber engages in the field of philosophical theology, which she
describes as the study of the “machinery of religious doctrines and the
logical problems they involve” (1). While the Christian doctrine of the
Trinity is not illogical (in the purest sense of the term), it has nonetheless
caused many a theologian and philosopher problems over the centuries—
problems in articulation and problems in explanation. Yet, it is not a doctrine that comes only by blind religious faith without the possibility of
philosophical inquiry and understanding. While some in scholarship may
see the philosophical inquiry into theology or doctrine as an inefficient
use of time and resources (especially if said inquiry does not answer major
human problems or support the formation of a particular philosophical
system), others, like Baber, deem the implications of such doctrine both
important and interesting. She leads the reader on a philosophical analytic
journey of the greatest doctrinal puzzle in history: How can the claim that
the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God be consistent
with the claim that they are also distinct? Or, to state the problem differently, how does one reconcile a monotheistic religious claim with the
doctrine of Christ’s divinity?
Baber begins with what I would consider an apologetic to her approach
in this work. The early articulations of the Trinitarian doctrine used the
philosophical terminology of the day regarding the “substance” of the
personages’s identity within the Trinity. Yet, there were disagreements as
to what the term referred, making it difficult to buttress one’s inquiry into
the matter. Baber, rather, finds that “the substantive question of Trinitarian
theology should be approached as a problem of characterizing the relations between Trinitarian Persons that make them count as one God
and distinguish them one from another” (16). The Hebrew conviction of
monotheism gives a background for inquiry, but even so, one must consider what they meant by the term. Often taken to engender identity and
counting, the concept may arguably be better understood to inquire as
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to who or what is a worship-worthy divine being. For the Hebrews, only
Jehovah met the criteria. This then raises the question, what are the criteria and how does Christianity avoid polytheism when claiming Christ is
divine? It was not enough that he be a supernatural being, for many religions have a plethora of such beings. Rather, the bar was set for one who
was the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent creator. That being the
case, identity per se is not as important as meeting the criteria for divinity. Much of the Trinitarian doctrine would then hinge on the Persons
satisfying such criteria. But then this creates other problems, as per the
Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII): if the persons who meet the
criteria are then indistinguishable in all intrinsic and extrinsic relational
properties they are identical. If one were to relax the criteria to distinguish
the Persons, then the Persons may no longer count as God. “There are no
philosophically respectable arguments for the existence of lesser supernatural beings [that are] anything like the gods of the Greeks” (37). Thus,
it is more fruitful to begin the inquiry with the relations of the Persons (the
processions or relations of origin) and address the identity question in a
further study.
Baber deconstructs the normal distinctions historically given to the
Trinitarian problem—designated as the De Régnon Paradigm (as implied
in the works of Catholic historian Theodore de Régnon) between the
Latin Trinitarianism of Augustine and Aquinas against the Greek/Social
Trinitarianism of the Cappadocian Fathers. The Latin school began with
unity, trying to make sense of the distinctions, while the Greek school did
the opposite. Scholars who have attempted to discuss such a distinction
have found that the differences do not line up as neatly as first thought.
Social Trinitarianism focuses on the distinctiveness of the Persons—each
being a distinct center of consciousness with their own knowledge, will,
and action, yet so tightly woven together that they form one particular
social unit or society. Some concerns arise in that the Social view is unable to answer concerns about how each distinct Person of divinity would
avoid disagreeing over agendas and actions. It could be argued that the
Father is authoritative and the other Persons merely defer to him, but
this does not explain how or why this deference takes place. Baber sees
the De Régnon distinction as one of a difference in the questions asked
of Trinitarian theology; thus one must answer both the Latin and Greek
questions accounting for “both the unity and distinctions of the persons”
(52). She contends that philosophers ought not seek to defend or define a
particular orthodoxy, but rather develop a logically coherent theology that
has the capability of affirming monotheism and Christ’s divinity. Baber
will then argue that the Son and Holy Spirit are divine in virtue of their
relation to the Father, the one of whom no greater can be conceived, the
unique worship-worthy God. This understanding is of great importance
since it seemingly turns PII (as normally understood) on its head. The
Persons within the Godhead are indiscernible regarding both intrinsic
and extrinsic properties, but are instead discernible only with regard to
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their relation with one another. Another consideration is the Council of
Nicaea’s handling of the subject with its emphasis on the Son being of one
“substance” with the Father. Baber argues that this was not so much to
define the doctrine as to exclude the Arian heresy. Thus, the work of the
philosophic inquiry is to “make sense of the claim that Christ, identified
as the Son and distinct from the Father, is fully divine,” so the path to
consider is that of “the relations between Trinitarian Persons in virtue of
which they are distinct but equal to the Father and so fully divine” (60).
Baber specifically tackles and dismantles the normal analytic approach to
trinitarian doctrine of Social Trinitarianism (in the form of Three-Self trinitarian theology). Social trinitarians make more of the claim than they are able
to prove or deliver and have often used the approach to further their own
social or political agendas. This is misplaced as the philosophical inquiry
into the Trinity does not have an immediate practical import, but rather
addresses the logical difficulties that the doctrine poses. Social Trinitarianism
views the Trinity as a divine society where the Persons interact with one
another in a manner akin to humans and are therefore a model for human
relationships—a veritable gold mine for social scientists to try to advocate
for their particular social constructs using the Trinity as their validation.
However, the Social Trinitarian view comes at a cost. For example, Baber
indicates a central feature of interpersonal relations is epistemic asymmetry,
where the individual is privileged to their own epistemic state. Yet, each of
the Persons of the Trinity, being omniscient, would know everything about
everything including the psychological state of the other. Social Trinitarians
will offer proof texts from Scripture and from the church fathers, but their
interpretations were not embraced by much of Christianity throughout its
history, reconstruction and misinterpretations notwithstanding. For example, Gregory of Nyssa’s analogy of the Trinitarian persons sharing a nature
to three men sharing a nature has been accepted as demonstrating “three
distinct centers of consciousness [that] interact interpersonally with one
another in community” (83), yet this results from taking the analogy way
beyond its original intention. Social Trinitarians also argue for viewing the
Trinity as a community of mutual holy love based on God being perfect
in love—a love understood as the desire for the good of the object loved.
Since some theologians would argue that self-love is not a virtuous love,
and since the creation is not necessary, the argument goes that God must
have a love for a distinct divine other. Baber believes that a weakness of the
love argument is that it does not explain why there are three (no more, no
less) divine subjects, nor does it preclude two or more distinct gods with a
mutual love, rather than a monotheistic view of one God with three distinct
divine persons. In what she sees as another overreach, Social Trinitarians
look to the community of the Godhead “to articulate an understanding of
human nature, to provide an account of the good life and the good society,
and to support their preferred moral views and political agendas” (96). This
venture is problematic in that no two Social Trinitarians agree about the
details of human community that the Trinity doctrine supposedly prompts,
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they give no impetus as to why their views are different from their secular
counterparts, and they do not take serious consideration of the human condition in its fallen state. The danger is using one’s Trinitarian theology as
a weapon in pushing one’s own political agenda. Baber rightly notes that
there is “a difficulty in extracting any insights about human nature, moral
agendas, or recommendations for social organization from any theological
account of the Trinity, including the Social Trinitarians’ preferred account”
(102). There just is no leverage to the idea that the Trinitarian Persons relate
in the same sense as humans; therefore, Social Trinitarian Three-Self doctrine is left wanting.
Baber continues by addressing the answers given by the Latin and
Greek questions per her relational take. With the Latin question, since
each Person shares the same intrinsic generically divine properties, their
distinction must be found in some other difference between them. As
mentioned earlier, per the PII, if the Persons share the same relevant properties, they would be identical. Yet the Persons are distinct, so there must
be one differentiating property that they do not share. Of course, the PII
itself is controversial in that not all agree what qualities count for the purposes of the principle, and if it includes both intrinsic and extrinsic qualities or solely intrinsic. In addition, counterexamples appear to weaken
the PII argument (for example Max Black’s illustration of two identical
spheres in a symmetrical universe). Baber considers other possibilities
for making the distinction (what one might consider weaker versions of
the PII). One view is that the objects have haecceities which are “impure
properties that make them the particular individuals they are and distinguish them from other individuals, including their qualitative duplicates”
(115). These would allow non-qualitative differences in properties without
implying inequality between objects. There are also ways of differentiating Persons through the asymmetric relation of objects to one another or
their irreflexive relation (as, for example, two identical spheres that are
one mile from each other but are obviously not one mile from themselves).
In addition, some Social Trinitarians argue that each of the Persons within
the Trinity might have some hypostatic properties intrinsic and essential
to them that are indiscernible to mere mortals. However, if the persons
are not intrinsically differentiated as in such models, it is possible they
are extrinsically differentiated. Sabellianism (modalism) attempted to differentiate the Persons through their communication with the world—the
same being interacting with the world in three distinct ways. This heretical view, while not necessarily logically problematic from an economic
Trinitarian perspective, fails to distinguish divine Persons and violates the
Necessity of Identity, since it allows that God is not necessarily Trinitarian.
One final possibility is Structuralism, investigating the structural features
of the subject. Most often used in mathematics, a structure is “the abstract
form of a system, which ignores or abstracts away from any features of
the objects that do not bear on their relations. . . . The objects of a system occupy places within the structure and, since different systems may
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exemplify the same structure, different objects may occupy the same place
within a structure” (141). The Trinitarian Persons can be understood as
places within a structure differentiated by their asymmetrical relations.
Since each part in the system is an individual substance with a rational
nature, the Persons are objectively distinct, and the differentiating relations are real relations all of which are essential to the system. Therefore,
we may “understand the Trinitarian Persons as objects differentiated by
the places they occupy within the Trinitarian structure” (144). Although
not a perfect explanation, it does offer a way to differentiate the Persons
by the places they occupy within the structure.
The Greek question assumes there are three divine Persons and inquires
about what it is that makes them one God. Since the divinity of the Father
is not in dispute, the larger question is what then makes the Son and Holy
Spirit divine in a way that preserves the shared nature? Some claim that
the Son and Spirit are dependent on the Father metaphysically, therefore
an account of the relation is due—a relation that is atemporal, asymmetric,
and necessary. The term “Father” was oft utilized to refer to the paradigmatic divine being, but this in no way granted him some special metaphysical status that made the Son and Spirit metaphysically dependent on
him nor made them in any way subordinate. Instead, in response to the
Greek question, “we develop a Trinitarian theology in which the Father
is the source of unity, uniting the Trinitarian Persons by the relations of
ontological dependence that the Son and Spirit bear to the Father” (162).
Baber suggests that there is a dependence of Son on Father, where the Son
is divine in virtue of the Father being divine, but it is not a causal dependence. The existence and character of the Father explains the existence and
character of Father and Son, but not the other way around. Grounding sets
the direction of a satisfactory explanation and sets the stage for further
discussion on the metaphysics of the Trinity. The Father is the ground and
not the cause in the ontological relations of the Persons. Still, it is a struggle
to make sense of the claim that one eternal, necessary being is dependent
upon another eternal, necessary being. The grounding account views God
the Father in some (seemingly undefined) sense the principle upon which
the other Trinitarian Persons depend. “Grounds and the grounded are not
‘separate existences.’ They are not temporally or modally distinct” (176).
Being given this answer I could not help asking how exactly this grounding relation works, but as Baber herself admits this cries out for further
discussion which I believe ought to occur as others interact with this book.
While not intending to be exhaustive, Baber’s work brings to the fore
several of the most important ideas regarding this subject. It is a perfect
complement of her previous articles without rehashing the same information. She fairly handles opposing views, giving strong reasons for her
disagreements. This is a deft example of philosophical theology at work,
fulfilling its calling of demonstrating the importance of the subject while
also making it interesting. Philosophers and theologians would benefit
from drinking deeply from this well.

